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NOTES 
Participatory Management Under Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of 
the National Labor Relations Act 
The employees must have the opportunity of participating in the deci-
sions as to what shall be their condition and how the business shall be 
run. They must learn also in sharing that responsibility that they must 
bear the suffering arising from grave mistakes, just as the employer must. 
But the right to assist in making the decisions, the right of making their 
own mistakes, if mistakes there must be, is a privilege which should not 
be denied to labor. We must insist upon labor sharing the responsibili-
ties for the result of the business. 
- Louis D. Brandeis1 
The widely reported Japanese economic "miracle"2 has prompted 
both management theorists3 and social commentators4 to urge Ameri-
can enterprises to adopt Japanese5 management techniques. Often 
1. Brandeis, The Curse of Bigness, in AN AMERICAN PRIMER 757, 761 (D. Boorstin ed. 
1966). 
2. See, e.g., Vogel, The Miracle of Japan, SAT. REv., May 26, 1979, at 18; cf. Neff, The Other 
Side of the Japanese Miracle, INTL. MGMT., Oct. 1982, at 19 (reporting rising worker dissatisfac-
tion in Japan and concluding that "bottom-up decision making is not necessarily central to the 
success of Japanese corporations"). 
3. See, e.g., w. OUCHI, THEORY Z: How AMERICAN BUSINESS CAN MEET THE JAPANESE 
CHALLENGE (1981); R. PASCALE & A. ATHOS, THE ART OF JAPANESE MANAGEMENT (1981); 
see also England, Japanese and American Management: Theory Zand Beyond, 14 J. INTL, Bus. 
STUD., Fall 1983, at 131. 
4. See, e.g., D. JENKINS, JOB POWER (1973); WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL 
CHANGE (F. Lindenfeld & J. Rothschild-Whitt eds. 1982). These authors focus on participatory 
management as a means of increasing worker control over the factors of production, while the 
management theorists concentrate on the potential for increased labor productivity under Japa-
nese-style management systems. 
5. Although often viewed by the popular press as a creation of Japanese culture, par-
ticipatory management's origins cannot be traced to any one source. Various forms of worker 
participation in management are widespread in the European Economic Community. See, e.g., 
Gevers, Worker Participation in Health and Safety in the EEC· The Role of Representative Insti• 
tutions, 122 INTL. LAB. REv. 411 (1983). In some EEC countries, most notably West Germany, 
worker participation in the form of employee representation on corporate boards of directors is 
required by statute. See, e.g., Mitbestimmungsgesetz § 15(2), 1976 BGBI, pt. 1, at 1153, 1157 
(West Germany's 1976 Codetermination Act). See also J. FURLONG, LABOR IN THE BOARD· 
ROOM (1977) (containing extensive discussion and English translation of the Codetermination 
Act); Hopt, New Ways in Corporate Governance: European Experiments with Labor Representa-
tion on Corporate Boards, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1338, 1350-51 (1984). 
Ironically, perhaps the largest experiment with participatory management occurred in the 
United States during World War II, with the encouragement of the federal government's War 
Production Board. This experiment, which involved some 2.5 million workers in labor-manage-
ment committees, led some commentators to advocate increased labor-management cooperation 
in the postwar period. See, e.g., E. LEVER & F. GOODELL, LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERA· 
TION (1948). 
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drawn together under the rubric of "participatory management,"6 
these methods of workplace control emphasize employee participation 
in enterprise decisionmaking. While such participation can take many 
forms, ranging from mere suggestion boxes to employee ownership, 
the most common American adaptations of particip.atory management 
involve the formation of groups, or committees, composed of repre-
sentatives of labor and management.7 Often these committees focus 
on a specific problem area, such as quality control, 8 but some vary 
widely in function and scope.9 
Managers of nonunion 10 plants who wish to implement par-
ticipatory management often must initiate the machinery of employee 
participation themselves. 11 In so doing, however, managers risk run-
6. Some social commentators have attempted to distance themselves from the management 
theorists by distinguishing the different types of participatory management. See, e.g., Roths-
child-Whitt & Lindenfeld, Reshaping Work: Prospects and Problems of Workplace Democracy, in 
WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL CHANGE, supra note 4, at 4: 
"Participation," "participative management," and the like have become such popular terms 
in United States industry today that it is important to distinguish their usage from what we 
mean by economic democracy. . . . [W]orker participation can be treated as a continuum 
from the most modest levels of participation, employee consultation in decision-making, to 
the wider levels of employee coinjluence to joint management or codetermination, and finally 
to full worker's control ovc;r the process and product of labor. 
(emphasis in original) (citation omitted). This Note is concerned with some of the more "mod-
est" levels of participation, such as employee consultation and coinfiuence. See Section I infra. 
1. See Section I infra; see also Prizinsky, Companies Express Optimism for Labor-Manage-
ment Teams, Am. Metal Market, Mar. 12, 1982, at 3, col. 1; Main, The Trouble With Managing 
Japanese-style, FORTUNE, Apr. 2, 1984, at 50 (quality circles "probably the most popular 
import"). 
8. The quality control (QC) circle is one of the specific aspects of Japanese management 
considered most adaptable to American settings. See notes 24-29 infra and accompanying text; 
see also W. OucHI, supra note 3, at 261-68; but cf Middleman & Rosenbloom, Can Quality 
Circle Concept Work in U.S.?, J. Com., July 29, 1982, at 4A, col. 2; Main, supra note 7 (describ-
ing the failure of quality circle programs at several United States companies). 
9. See generally Ishikawa, A Survey of Studies in the Japanese Style of Management, 3 EcoN. 
& INDUS. DEMOCRACY 1 (1982). 
10. Participatory management techniques have flourished in many heavily unionized indus-
tries, particularly automobile manufacturing. See, e.g., Job, Saturn Gives Management Role to 
Workers, Det. News, Jan. 11, 1985 (describing the role of the United Auto Workers in designing 
a participatory management system for General Motors' Saturn division). In a unionized setting, 
management usually must seek worker approval through the collective bargaining representative 
before implementing the changes in work rules and job classifications that participatory manage-
ment techniques typically require. If the workers, through their bargaining representative, ap-
prove the changes, then there is no question regarding their legality. However, some collectively 
bargained contracts do not prevent employers from installing participatory management pro-
grams without the union's cooperation. For a discussion of the legality of that technique under 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), see Sockell, The Legality of Employee-Participation 
Programs in Unionized Firms, 37 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 541 (1984). 
This Note's analysis is restricted to nonunion employees because the issues presented when a 
union already represents the employees involve the "exclusivity doctrine" of § 9(a) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982) (hereinafter re-
ferred to as "NLRA" or "Act"), rather than § 8(a)(2)'s prohibition of employer-dominated labor 
organizations, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982). See Sockell, supra, at 543-46. 
11. Although nonunion employees may, and sometimes do, suggest participatory manage-
ment programs, the lack of organization among nonunion employees makes it more likely that 
management will first suggest changes in workplace organization. 
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ning afoul of section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA or Act), 12 which makes it an unfair labor practice for employ-
ers to interfere with, dominate, or assist employee labor 
organizations.13 
This Note argues that participatory management programs initi-
ated by the employer in nonunion settings should be permissible under 
the NLRA when they do not restrict the freedom of employees to 
choose their own bargaining representative. Section I describes the 
major currents of participatory management theory. Section II ex-
plores the restrictive interpretation the National Labor Relations 
Board (Board) and the courts have traditionally given those sections of 
the NLRA applicable to participatory management programs. Section 
III describes the increasingly permissive approach taken by some 
courts, and to a lesser extent by the Board, in applying the NLRA to 
participatory management settings. Section IV examines the legisla-
tive histories of the NLRA and subsequent federal labor legislation, 
and concludes that participatory management furthers federal labor 
relations policy. 
I. TYPES OF PARTICIPATORY MANAGEMENT 
The term "participatory management" encompasses several over-
lapping approaches to increased employee involvement in workplace 
decisionmaking.14 Labor-management committees, quality of work 
life projects, quality control circles, and employee production teams 
are four common labels applied to participatory management efforts in 
American enterprises. 15 In the interest of clarity, each type of pro-
gram will be discussed separately, although in practice an enterprise 
may utilize a combination of these participatory techniques. 
Labor-management committees first became widespread during 
World War II as a method of improving productivity, solving produc-
tion-related problems, and preventing labor strife by boosting em-
12. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982). 
13. Section 8(a)(2) states "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer • • • to domi-
nate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute 
financial or other support to it .... " 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982). See notes 66-82 & 101-22 
infra and accompanying text. Section 2(5) defines a "labor organization" as "any organization of 
any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees 
participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers 
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of 
work." 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982). See notes 44-65 & 86-100 infra and accompanying text. 
14. See note 6 supra. 
15. The terminology used here is not intended to suggest that participatory management is 
limited to these four types. Other forms of worker participation, such as employee representa-
tion on corporate boards of directors, are excluded from the analysis because they have already 
received adequate discussion in the literature. See, e.g., Note, Worker Ownership and Section 
8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 91 YALE L.J. 615 (1982). 
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ployee morale. 16 Considering the successful track record of such 
committees in many unionized plants, 17 it is not surprising that they 
have begun to appear in nonunion settings as well. 18 In both contexts, 
many labor-management committees19 have various combinations of 
the following characteristics:20 (1) they consist of a roughly equal 
number of representatives of labor and management; (2) two co-
chairpersons - one from each side - are appointed by mutual con-
sent, and serve either on a rotating basis or concurrently; (3) meetings 
are held on a regular basis, or sometimes on an as-needed basis; 
(4) committees set their own priorities, generally concentrating on 
matters on which both parties can agree; and (5) employee members 
and foremen are rotated so that a large number of people are involved 
in the joint consultative process. 
Quality of work life (QWL) projects are specifically designed to 
improve the quality of work life. Although sometimes considered a 
special type of labor-management committee, they have distinct char-
acteristics which merit special treatment.21 QWL projects focus on 
interpersonal relationships among workers and the general "humani-
zation" of labor conditions. They are designed to make workers' tasks 
more meaningful and satisfying, which in tum should lead to gains in 
productivity.22 QWL projects differ from other participatory manage-
16. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR PRODUCTIVITY AND QUALITY OF WORKING LIFE, START-
ING A LABOR-MANAGEMENT CoMMITI'EE IN YOUR ORGANIZATION 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited 
as NATIONAL CENTER); see also note 5 supra. 
17. See NATIONAL CENTER, supra note 16, at 10-11; see also note 10 supra. The Center was 
created by Congress in 1975 for a variety of purposes, including "the continued development of 
joint labor-management efforts to provide a healthy environment for collective bargaining." Na-
tional Productivity and Quality of Working Life Act of 1975, § 1(8), 15 U.S.C. § 2401(8) (1982). 
18. See K. FRIEDEN, WORKPLACE DEMOCRACY AND PRODUCTIVITY 31-37 (1980) ("Labor-
management committees . • • are generally outside or supplementary to normal collective bar-
gaining channels."). While committees in unionized plants often receive more attention because 
of their size and scope, some employers have attempted to develop committees in the absence of 
previous worker organization. It is precisely this situation that the courts have frowned upon. 
See, e.g., Classic Indus. v. NLRB, 667 F.2d 205 (1st Cir. 1981). But see NLRB v. Northeastern 
Univ., 601 F.2d 1208 (1st Cir. 1979) (employer-assisted labor-management committee approved 
despite NLRA when employer did not actually dominate committee). See generally notes 101-22 
infra and accompanying text. 
19. Because labor-management committees differ significantly from one another, a case-by-
case approach would seem the most sensible method of analyzing their legality under the NLRA. 
Yet traditionally the Board and the courts have applied a strict, per se standard preventing the 
operation of joint committees absent a recognized collective bargaining apparatus. See notes 66-
82 infra and accompanying text. Some courts, recognizing that employer-involvement in com-
mittees varies greatly, have abandoned the per se approach in favor of a case-by-case analysis. 
See notes 101-22 infra and accompanying text. 
20. The following list is adapted from a longer list in NATIONAL CENTER, supra note 16, at 
22-23. References to union involvement are omitted because the analysis of this Note is re-
stricted to nonunion settings. The Center, in presenting the list, emphasized that there are "no 
set rules" governing the attributes of labor-management committees. Id. at 22. 
21. See generally Maccoby, Helping Labor and Management Set Up a Quality-of-Worklife 
Program, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1984, at 28; NATIONAL CENTER, supra note 16, at 29-32. 
22. See NATIONAL CENTER, supra note 16, at 29 ("This phrase [QWL) covers various efforts 
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ment techniques in that their initial focus is on worker satisfaction 
rather than productivity; thus, employees are more likely to suggest 
that a QWL project be undertaken.23 
The quality control (QC) circle is perhaps the most widely advo-
cated "Japanese" participatory management technique.24 QC circles 
are small groups of workers (usually no more than ten per group) that 
meet weekly for one or two hours to discuss work problems and poten-
tial improvements in the production process.25 A successful program 
will usually involve a plantwide system of circles, but each circle in-
cludes workers from only one department, with discussions limited to 
issues affecting that department. 26 These work discussions, run by the 
workers but with supervisory personnel present and involved, typically 
generate recommendations for specific improvements, which are then 
passed on to management for consideration. Approval is routine, 
although management retains the power to refuse any recommenda-
tion made by the circle. 27 
QC circles differ from QWL projects because of their emphasis on 
productivity and product quality. Although QC circles are considered 
more effective if approached with an attitude of humanity toward the 
worker,28 the immediate objective of the QC circle is still an improved 
to improve the work environment. It includes rather specific programs of work restructuring, 
which involves redesigning job content and responsibilities, in order to permit greater discretion 
at lower organizational levels."). The Center's report proceeds to recount an example of a QWL 
project at a Tennessee plant which was "so successful in terms of both work satisfaction and 
productivity that more than 80 percent of the union members voted to enlarge the program." Id. 
at 30-31. 
23. A statement made by a vice president of the United Auto Workers Union illustrates the 
distinction: 
Traditionally, management has called upon labor to cooperate in increasing productivity 
and improving the quality of the product. My view is that the other side of the coin is more 
appropriate; namely, that management should cooperate with the workers to find ways to 
enhance the human dignity oflabor and to tap the creative resources of each human being in 
developing a more satisfying worklife, with emphasis on worker participation in the deci-
sionmaking process. 
NATIONAL CENTER, supra note 16, at 30. The source of a project's inception can be the crucial 
factor when the "actual domination" test is applied under § 8(a)(2). When employees initially 
suggest that a labor-management committee or QWL program be formed, the Board and the 
courts are much less likely to find the employer guilty of unfairly "dominating" the resulting 
employee organization. See note 107 infra and accompanying text. 
24. See generally W. OUCHI, supra note 3, at 261-68; Middleman & Rosenbloom, supra note 
8; Bishop & Gunz, Does Your Management Need A Quality Circle?, DIRECTOR, July 1982, at 27; 
cf M. SASHKIN, A MANAGER'S GUIDE TO PARTICIPATIVE MANAGEMENT 57-59 (1982) (QC 
circles not a Japanese innovation, but rather an adaptation of American management techniques 
of the 1940s). 
25. See W. OUCHI, supra note 3, at 262-63. 
26. See id. at 262. 
27. See id. at 263. 
28. See id. at 266-67 ("Unfortunately, many American companies seem to insist on the use of 
Q-C Circles simply by managerial fiat. The Japanese stress the impossibility of this approach. 
Instead, management must create positive conditions, and then the patience to allow effort and 
morale to grow naturally."). 
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product. QWL projects, by contrast, propose to improve the quality of 
workers' roles in the production process under the theory that satisfied 
workers produce higher quality products at lower cost.29 
The employee production team is one participatory management 
technique already enjoying some success in the United States. Borrow-
ing from the managerial successes of Swedish automakers, 30 several 
major American corporations began using employee production teams 
on an experimental basis in the early 1970s.31 
Typically, management initiates employee production teams by as-
signing a plant's production workers into groups. Each group, or 
team, is responsible for some defined segment of plant operations. 
Within that segment, the team is given considerable autonomy in de-
ciding how subtasks are divided and performed.32 For example, man-
agers in a General Foods plant in Topeka, Kansas, allowed team 
members to manage the day-to-day production process, participate in 
personnel decisions which would affect team composition, and resolve 
grievances of other team members.33 Team members were compen-
sated according to the number of different jobs they mastered, which 
created an incentive for members to learn each other's jobs, thus dis-
couraging the development of repetitive, assembly-line tasks.34 
Like QWL projects, employee production teams are designed to 
reduce worker alienation. However, management may find it more 
palatable to install production teams, whose purpose is more directly 
linked to productivity gains, than QWL projects, which are designed 
primarily to improve worker satisfaction. 35 Thus, employee produc-
tion teams may develop more rapidly in nonunion settings, where 
management usually chooses which methods of participatory manage-
ment to employ. 
29. Because the central objective of QC circles - an improved product - appears to benefit 
employers more directly than employees, management is far more likely than the workers to 
propose organization of employees into QC circles. Therefore, if QC circles are considered "la-
bor organizations" under the NLRA, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the employer has 
"dominated" the formation of the circles in violation of § 8(a)(2). See Section /IL A. infra. 
30. See Walton, How to Counter Alienation in the Plant, HARV. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1972, 
at 70, 80; see generally Carson, Preparing Workers for Participation, INTL. MGMT., Jan. 1973, at 
44. 
31. See Walton, supra note 30 (discussing managerial innovations by General Foods, Procter 
& Gamble, and TRW). See generally D. JENKINS, supra note 4, at 225-35. 
32. See Walton, supra note 30, at 74-75. 
33. See D. JENKINS, supra note 4, at 227-28. 
34. Id. 
35. Because they are more likely to be formed or at least initially suggested by management, 
employee production teams, like QC circles, may be subject to attack as company-dominated 
"labor organizations" prohibited by§ 8(a)(2). But see General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 
(1977), discussed at notes 95-96 infra. See generally Note, Does Employer Implementation of 
Employee Production Teams Violate Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act?, 49 IND. 
L.J. 516 (1974). 
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II. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO PARTICIPATORY 
MANAGEMENT UNDER THE NLRA 
The success of participatory management in Japan depends heavily 
on that nation's modern tradition of labor-management cooperation. 
Although Japanese labor and management do not view their interests 
as entirely consonant, they tend to view one another with less suspi-
cion and hostility than do their American counterparts.36 Labor and 
management in America have a history of more confrontational, ad-
versarial relations.37 American labor law, particularly the NLRA, re-
flects that history by codifying an adversarial model of relations 
between labor and management. 38 
Faced with organized labor's strong desire to outlaw "company 
36. See, e.g., E. VOGEL, JAPAN AS NUMBER ONE: LESSONS FOR AMERICA 131-57 (1979). 
Vogel attributes labor-management cooperation in Japan to both cultural and historical sources: 
The success of Japanese companies in avoiding disruptive labor unrest must be understood 
in the context of long-run individual identification with the company, but it has been rein-
forced by company handling oflabor unions. After World War II, when the Allied Occupa-
tion ordered a rapid expansion oflabor unions, Japanese company executives moved quickly 
to make employees members of labor unions. Labor unions were thus born not from viru-
lent struggles led by bitter union leaders but from the initiative of company leaders. , , • 
Nonetheless, unions do energetically represent the interests of the workers in pushing for 
benefits .••. Though very worried about the danger of unions in the late 1940s, manage-
ment has come to regard their unions as friends in helping stabilize the company. To avoid 
an excessive adversary relationship and create a proper climate, management finds time to 
socialize with union leaders without waiting for disputes that engender an atmosphere of 
controversy. 
Id. at 153-54. But see Levine & Taira, Interpreting Industrial Conflict: The Case of Japan, in 
LABOR RELATIONS IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES 61, 84 (B. Martin & E. Kassalow, 
eds. 1980) ("[l]ndustrial conflict has become as much a part of the Japanese ethos as it has in 
other industrialized market econoinies."). See generally W. GOULD, JAPAN'S RESHAPING OP 
AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1984). 
37. Both the original NLRA (Wagner Act) and the Taft-Hartley Act were at least ostensibly 
directed at the adverse econoinic effects of acrimonious relations between management and labor, 
The NLRA states its purposes as follows: "The denial by some employers of the right of employ-
ees to organize and the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargain-
ing lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or 
necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce ...• " 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). The 
Taft-Hartley Act, passed in 1947 to supplement and amend the Wagner Act, states as its policy 
that "[i]ndustrial strife which interferes with the normal flow of commerce and with the full 
production of articles and commodities for commerce, can be avoided or substantially minimized 
if employers, employees, and labor organizations each recognize under law one another's legiti-
mate rights in their relations with each other ...• " 29 U.S.C. § 14l(b) (1982). Thus, the pre-
vention of industrial strife, and not necessarily the promotion of an adversary system of labor 
relations, is the primary purpose of federal labor legislation. See notes 132-45 infra and accom-
panying text (arguing that the Wagner Act was intended to permit labor-management coopera-
tion as a means of encouraging the peaceful settlement of labor disputes). 
38. Some commentators have argued that the central policy of federal labor legislation is the 
preservation of an adversarial model of employer-employee relations. See, e.g., Note, Collective 
Bargaining as an Industrial System: An Argument Against Judicial Revision of Section 8(a)(2) of 
the National Labor Relations Act, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1662 (1983). A more accurate statement 
would be that the prevention of industrial strife through the preservation of both employers' and 
employees' rights is the one overriding concern offederal labor policy. See note 37 supra. While 
Congress envisioned that an adversary model might help achieve those ends, it did not preclude 
cooperation between workers and management, provided that the rights of all parties are 
preserved. 
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unions,"39 Congress developed a framework in the NLRA to prohibit 
management from interfering with the formation and development of 
labor organizations.40 This framework places substantial barriers be-
tween labor and management to ensure that the right of employees to 
choose their own independent bargaining agent is not impeded.41 
These barriers have accomplished their original purpose; the "com-
pany union" practices of the 1930s have been eradicated.42 In the pro-
cess of eliminating company unions, however, the NLRB and many 
courts have construed the language of the NLRA so broadly that 
many employer practices far removed from union creation have been 
struck down. 43 
A. Section 2(5): Defining ''Labor Organization" 
Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA proscribes employer interference with 
39. In the 1920s, many employers attempted to prevent employees from joining more antago-
nistic national and international labor unions by forming their own unions and presenting them 
to the employees as independent mechanisms for collective bargaining. See R. DUNN, CoMPANY 
UNIONS (1927) (presenting the "progressive trade union slant on company unions"); cf. Nelson, 
The Company Union Movement, 1900-1937: A Reexamination, 56 Bus. HIST. REv. 335 (1982) 
(arguing that some company unions made important contributions to the development of a pro-
fessional approach to labor relations). Senator Wagner, the author of the original NLRA, was a 
leading proponent of the elimination of employer-dominated company unions. See Wagner, 
Company Unions: A Vast Industrial Issue, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1934, § 9, at 1, col. 1, reprinted 
in 78 CoNG. REC. 4229-31 (1934), and in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 22-26 (1949) [hereinafter cited as LEG. HIST. NLRA]. 
40. See note 13 supra (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(5), 158(a)(2) (1982)). 
41. The formal division in the NLRA between labor and management contains two layers. 
First, § 2(5) defines labor organization to include far more than traditional union structures. See 
29 U.S.C. § 152(5). Second, § 8(a)(2) prohibits employers from dominating, interfering with, or 
assisting labor organizations as defined in § 2(5). Thus, a manager who wishes to implement a 
participatory management program must either refrain from forming her employees into groups 
which qualify as § 2(5) labor organizations, or she must refrain from dominating, interfering 
with, or even assisting in the formation or administration of such organizations. In practice, 
some courts have created precedents that allow management to circumvent either barrier, de-
pending upon the makeup of the participatory organization and the role the company performs 
in the organization's operation. See notes 83-122 infra and accompanying text. 
42. The demise of company unions is well documented. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 39, at 
335 (Company unions were "[o)bliterated by the Congress and the courts during the 1930s."). 
43. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.) (informal employee committee 
that met with employer to make suggestions and discuss conditions of employment was a labor 
organization under the NLRA), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971); NLRB v. General Shoe Corp., 
192 F.2d 504 (6th Cir. 1951) (evidence that employer met, advised, and dealt with five employee 
committees sufficient to show that committees were labor organizations), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 
904 (1952); Predicasts, Inc., 270 N.L.R.B. No. 170, at 10, 1984-85 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 1116,451, 
at 28,125-26 (1984) ("Personnel Committee" designed to serve as an "information exchange be-
tween employees and management" ruled a labor organization because it informally mediated 
employee grievances and made nonbinding recommendations to management); Sunnen Prods., 
Inc., 189 N.L.R.B. 826 (1971) (employee advisory board composed of and freely elected by em-
ployees ruled a labor organization). In all of these cases, employer involvement in the organiza-
tion's formation was considered pervasive enough to support an 8(a)(2) violation. Cf. Chicago 
Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955), discussed in text at notes 105-16 
infra. 
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employee "labor organizations."44 Thus, for a participatory manage-
ment program to be struck down under section 8(a)(2), the employee 
group must be considered a "labor organization" under the Act. At 
first glance, participatory management groups do not appear to be la-
bor organizations in the usual sense of the term. 45 This is particularly 
true for employee production teams and QC circles, which are 
designed solely to increase productivity. However, the NLRA's defini-
tion of labor organization encompasses much more than the tradi-
tional union structure. Under section 2(5): 
The term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind, or 
any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which em-
ployees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, 
of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, 
rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.46 
Thus, for a group of employees to be considered a labor organization, 
three requirements must be met: (1) the employees must participate in 
the group; (2) the group must have as one of its purposes "dealing 
with" the employer; and (3) the subject matter of those dealings must 
include grievances, labor disputes, wage rates, employment hours, or 
working conditions. 
In participatory management programs, employees clearly partici-
pate in the groups or committees; increased worker participation is a 
major purpose of such programs.47 It is less clear whether employee 
participation groups exist for the purpose of "dealing with" the em-
ployer regarding matters traditionally reserved for collective bargain-
ing. Although to some extent this determination should be handled on 
a case-by-case basis, 48 in NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co. 49 the Supreme 
Court interpreted the "dealing with" language of section 2(5) in a way 
that appears to leave only a small area open for argument. 
Cabot Carbon arose out of the War Production Board's (WPB) en-
couragement of labor-management committees during World War 
II. 50 With the WPB's encouragement and approval, the Cabot Carbon 
44. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982) (defining labor organization); see also notes 13 & 41 supra. 
45. "Labor organization" is synonymous with "union" in most nonlegal contexts. But from 
management's point of view, participatory teams or circles may simply represent a different 
method of allocating labor tasks within the plant. Employers typically implement participatory 
management programs to increase labor productivity, not to provide labor with a collective bar-
gaining representative. 
46. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982) (emphasis added). 
47. See note 23 supra. 
48. See text following note 179 infra. 
49. 360 U.S. 203 (1959). 
50. The source of the unfair labor practice charge in Cabot Carbon was the company's prac-
tice of arranging its workers into "Employee Committees." The Board described the "[o]rigin 
and formation" of the committees as follows: 
During World War II the War Production Board encouraged critical war industries, includ-
ing the Respondents, to set up joint "Labor Management Committees" for the purpose of 
promoting the war effort to increase production. Consequently, Cabot's director of ind us-
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Company set up employee committees at several of its plants, both 
union and nonunion.51 After the war, the company simply continued 
to hold meetings of the existing committees, and new committees were 
formed as new plants were acquired.52 In the mid-1950s, a union rep-
resenting some of the company's employees53 filed several unfair labor 
practices against the company, alleging among other things that the 
employee committees were labor organizations under section 2(5), and 
that the company had impermissibly interfered with the formation and 
operation of the committees in violation of section 8(a)(2). 
The trial examiner agreed, finding that the committees were labor 
organizations under section 2(5).54 But the Fifth Circuit reversed the 
Board's enforcement order,55 holding that employees, whether indi-
vidually or in groups, "should be able to discuss problems of mutual 
interest with their employers - without violating the law."56 The 
court equated "dealing with" employers under section 2(5) and "bar-
gaining with" employers. Thus, under the Fifth Circuit's approach, 
employees could form groups, or be assigned to groups by their em-
ployer, so long as the groups did not undertake collective bargaining 
with the employer. In attempting to establish the right of employees 
to discuss problems and grievances outside the channels of collective 
bargaining, the court relied heavily on section 9(a) of the NLRA.57 It 
trial relations (Reno Stinson) in 1943 notified all plant managers in the Southwestern Divi-
sion to send elected employee representatives to a conference at Pampa, Texas. As 
moderator, Director Stinson drafted and submitted to the employees in attendance a set of 
bylaws for the establishment, procedure and control of employee committees in company 
plants and installations. Under the sponsorship of this conference, the bylaws were thereaf-
ter approved and adopted by management and employees throughout the Southwestern 
Division. 
Cabot Carbon Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 1633, 1640 (1957), enforcement denied, 256 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 
1958), revd., 360 U.S. 203 (1959). Thus, although the company provided the direct impetus for 
the committees' formation, the original idea to create the committees came from the federal 
government, through the War Production Board. 
51. 117 N.L.R.B. at 1640-42. The committee bylaws referred to slight differences in the 
jurisdiction of individual committees, depending upon whether the committee's plant had been 
organized. The only real differences related to the handling of grievances, which in organized 
plants were presumably handled directly by the union. 
52. 117 N.L.R.B. at 1642. 
53. The International Chemical Workers Union represented some of Cabot Carbon's em-
ployees but had been unsuccessful in its efforts to organize several plants in which labor-manage-
ment committees operated. 
54. The trial examiner noted that the committees provided a mechanism for resolving griev-
ances in nonunion plants, and that the recorded minutes of committee meetings revealed that 
"subjects pertaining to labor relations and working conditions were discussed and otherwise dealt 
with." 117 N.L.R.B. at 1643. These subjects included sick leave plans, holiday work schedules, 
job classifications, and even a "[r]equest that gloves for employees be furnished at cost through 
[the company's] supply room." 117 N.L.R.B. at 1643. 
55. Cabot Carbon Co. v. NLRB, 256 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1958), revd., 360 U.S. 203 (1959). 
56. 256 F.2d at 290. 
57. Section 9(a) reads: 
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the ma-
jority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive repre-
sentatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in 
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reviewed the legislative history of section 9(a) and concluded that 
Congress intended to allow "groups of employees to present to the 
employer grievances for adjustment, without the intervention of the 
bargaining representative, as long as there is no conflict with a collec-
tive bargaining contract."58 
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the Fifth Circuit's ruling 
and reinstated the Board's order.59 The Court emphasized that "deal-
ing with" meant something much more expansive than "bargaining 
with," and decided that the Cabot Carbon Company's "employee 
committees" had been dealing with the company regarding a number 
of matters usually reserved for the collective bargaining process. 60 
Thus, the Court found that the committees were "labor organizations" 
under section 2(5), despite the seemingly contrary provisions in sec-
tion 9(a) relied upon by the lower court.61 
The Supreme Court's construction of sections 2(5) and 9(a) leaves 
little room for employee organizations to qualify as something other 
than labor organizations under the NLRA. 62 While it is certainly pos-
sible for employers to meet with employees without forming "labor 
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: 
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any 
time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without 
the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsis-
tent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided 
further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such 
adjustment. 
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982) (emphasis in original). The language in § 9(a) that specifically allows 
employees to have grievances adjusted "without the intervention of the bargaining representa-
tive" was added as part of the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, 
58. 256 F.2d at 286. 
59. NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203 (1959). 
60. The Court clearly indicated its dissatisfaction with the Fifth Circuit's construction of 
"dealing with": 
Consideration of the declared purposes and actual functions of these Committees shows that 
they existed for the purpose, in part at least, "of dealing with employers concerning griev-
ances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." It 
cannot be, and is not, disputed that, by the terms of the bylaws, •.. the Employee Commit-
tees ..• "[h]andle[d] grievances ..• at nonunion plants and departments •.•. " It is 
therefore as plain as words can express that these Committees existed, at least in part, for 
the purpose "of dealing with employers concerning grievances ••.. " This alone brings 
these Committees squarely within the statutory definition of "labor organizations." 
360 U.S. at 213 (emphasis in original). The Court also noted that the Committees discussed with 
management "such matters as seniority, job classification, job bidding, working schedules, holi-
days, vacations, sick leave, a merit system, wage corrections, and improvement of working facili-
ties and conditions." 360 U.S. at 213. The Court concluded: "[W]e think that those activities 
establish that the Committees were 'dealing with' [the company], with respect to those subjects, 
within the meaning of§ 2(5)." 360 U.S. at 214. 
61. The Supreme Court took a narrow view of§ 9(a)'s scope and rejected the Fifth Circuit's 
argument because a congressional joint conference committee had refused to adopt a House ver-
sion of the Taft-Hartley Bill which would have specifically allowed labor-management commit-
tees in nonunion settings. For criticism of the Court's analysis, see Feldman & Steinberg, 
Employee-Management Committees and the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 35 TUL, 
L. R.Ev. 365, 376-86 (1961). See also notes 174-78 infra and accompanying text. 
62. See notes 83-85 infra and accompanying text. 
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organizations,"63 after Cabot Carbon the permitted scope of such 
meetings is severely circumscribed. The Court's construction of the 
"dealing with" language of section 2(5), combined with its dismissal of 
the Fifth Circuit's section 9(a) analysis, may leave little of substance 
for employee groups to accomplish. 64 While the Court's approach ef-
fectively prevents the operation of company unions in any guise, it 
may also inhibit the formation of legitimate mechanisms for the en-
hancement of employee participation in management. 65 
B. The Traditional Approach to ''Employer Domination" Under 
Section 8(a){2} 
In Cabot Carbon, it was clear that the employer had dominated the 
employee committees; the dispositive issue was whether those commit-
tees were labor organizations under the Act.66 Some cases, however, 
have held that employee organizations, although labor organizations 
under section 2(5), were nevertheless not "dominated" by the em-
ployer under section 8(a)(2) and were therefore permissible.67 But 
under the traditiorial approach to section 8(a)(2) cases, virtually all 
63. See, e.g., NLRB v. Streamway Div. of the Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 
1982); Fiber Materials, Inc., 228 N.L.RB. 933 (1977). 
64. Some commentators have detected a trend in Board decisions toward expanding the area 
of employee-management relations which lie outside the restrictions of § 2(5). See, e.g., Schur-
gin, The Limits of Organized Employer-Employee Relations in Non-Union Facilities: Some New 
Evidence of Flexibility, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 615, 623-38 (1981). Cases reflecting this trend, 
however, are "few in number." Id. at 623 n.39. See notes 95-100 infra and accompanying text. 
65. For example, under the Cabot Carbon analysis, employee groups that discuss "griev-
ances" or "conditions of work" are automatically considered labor organizations. In reality, 
however, any group of employees assembled for the purpose of communicating with management 
is likely to mention "grievances," usually as a way of indicating to management how "conditions 
of work," and therefore productivity, can be improved. For example, QC circles usually operate 
according to the following format: 
The technique itself [QC Circles] involves small groups of workers ... in weekly meetings. 
These meetings . . • center on the discussion of work problems and possible work improve-
ments. Specific solutions and improvement recommendations are submitted to management 
for approval; approval is typically granted. _Workers run the discussions, although supervi-
sors are usually present and involved, and the discussions must be conducted on company 
time. 
M. SASHKIN, supra note 24, at 58. A "discussion of work problems" may include almost any-
thing, including, for example, poor lighting or inadequate ventilation in work areas. When em-
ployees present to management "specific solutions and improvement recommendations" 
regarding such matters, the "dealing with" standard of Cabot Carbon will always be satisfied. 
Moreover, the subject matter of such "dealings" will usually include matters which clearly fit 
within the examples enumerated in§ 2(5), such as "grievances" or "conditions of work," if these 
terms are construed broadly. 
66. Even the Fifth Circuit, which decided the case in favor of the company, admitted that 
"there is not much doubt [that], if the committees are labor organizations, ... Cabot interfered 
with the administration of the committees, and assisted and supported the committees unlaw-
fully." 256 F.2d at 284 (emphasis in original). 
67. See, e.g., NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208 (1st Cir. 1979). For a discussion 
of the less restrictive approach to§ 8(a)(2) cases followed by some circuits, see notes 101-22 infra 
and accompanying text. 
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forms of employer support for section 2(5) labor organizations have 
been treated as unfair labor practices. 
The language of section 8(a)(2) contains broad restrictions on em-
ployer activity. Employer "domination" of and "interference" with 
labor organizations is prohibited, as is employer contribution of "fi-
nancial or other support" to such groups. 68 From the start, the Board 
and some courts have interpreted section 8(a)(2) as a comprehensive 
ban on employer involvement in the activities of section 2(5) labor 
organizations. 69 While the Board insists that it considers the "total-
ity" of the circumstances in each case, 70 some jurisdictions have in 
effect adopted a per se rule prohibiting employer cooperation with em-
ployee labor organizations. 71 As a result, many seemingly innocuous 
employer actions have been ruled unfair labor practices. 72 
The rationale for the per se approach to section 8(a)(2) cases may 
have been sound in 1935, but its continued vitality has become highly 
questionable. When the NLRA was enacted, the practice of company 
unionism was widespread.73 Section 8(a)(2)'s abolition of this practice 
was considered a major victory for organized labor. 74 Stringent en-
forcement of section 8(a)(2) by both the Board and the courts was 
necessary to accomplish the NLRA's objective of preserving employ-
68. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982). See note 13 supra. 
69. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jas. H. 'Matthews & Co., 156 F.2d 706 (3d Cir. 1946), where a "multi-
ple management" program comprised of several labor-management committees was deemed a 
labor organization despite the company's contention that the program was "but a committee of 
the workers designed to discuss and make recommendations to management about production 
problems." 156 F.2d at 707. The court suggested in dicta that a per se approach might be un-
wise: "the case perturbed us considerably at the argument for we were reluctant to reach a 
conclusion that labor and management cannot confer about production problems without violat• 
ing the Act." 156 F.2d at 707. However, in part because grievances were discussed by the 
committees, the court held that the employer's formation and operation of the "multiple manage• 
ment" program constituted an unfair labor practice because the committees were impermissibly 
dominated labor organizations. For a description of the "multiple management" system struck 
down in Matthews, see C. McCORMICK, MULTIPLE MANAGEMENT (1938). See generally Note, 
New Standards for Domination and Support Under Section 8(a}(2), 82 YALE L.J. 510, 511-14 
(1973). 
10. See 2 NLRB ANN. REP. 95 (1937): 
The activities of an employer which are intended to produce, or have the necessary effect of 
producing the result prescribed as an unfair labor practice are multifarious. The cases do 
not single out any one activity or circumstance as determinative of the existence of a viola-
tion under [§ 8(a)(2)]. In each of the cases so far determined a series of acts have been 
revealed which in their totality constitute domination or interference with a labor 
organization. 
71. See Note, supra note 69, at 511. Despite the Third Circuit's professed reluctance to 
follow a per se approach, see note 69 supra, no case in the twenty years following the Act's 
passage permitted any level of employer cooperation with employee "labor organizations," 
72. See, e.g., Wheeling Steel Corp., 1 N.L.R.B. 699, 708-09 (1936), enforced in part, 94 F.2d 
1021 (6th Cir. 1938) (fifty-cent annual donation per employee held to be unfair labor practice); 
see also cases cited in Note, supra note 69, at 512. 
73. See Wagner, supra note 39, at 1. 
14. See generally R. DUNN, supra note 39. 
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ees' freedom to select their own bargaining representatives. 75 How-
ever, the acceptance of independent labor unions as bargaining 
representatives,76 as well as the changing nature and declining number 
of 8(a)(2) cases, 77 significantly weaken the rationale for the per se ap-
proach. Modem employer practices challenged under 8(a)(2) rarely re-
semble company unionism as it existed before the NLRA. Instead, 
recent cases typically involve employer recognition of minority un-
ions, 78 or employer assistance favoring one outside union over another 
during competing organizational drives. 79 While these practices re-
quire the continued application of section 8(a)(2) to preserve employee 
free choice, they do not require a per se rule prohibiting all forms of 
employer cooperation with employee labor organizations. 
Moreover, the per se rule effectively excludes alternatives to the 
adversary model of labor relations. While the NLRA favors the ad-
versary approach as one way to ensure that employees' interests are 
vigorously advanced in collective bargaining, Congress did not intend 
to force that model on employees who do not desire outside represen-
tation by an independent union. so Rules preserving employee "free 
choice" should not be enforced more strictly when employees choose 
75. The Board's restrictive approach has been described as an attempt to further three inter-
related policies of the NLRA: (1) protection of employee free choice; (2) protection of the then-
fledgling labor movement; and (3) insuring vigorous representation for employees (if they wish 
representation at all). See Jackson, An Alternative to Unionization and the Wholly Unorganized 
Shop: A Legal Basis for Sanctioning Joint Employer-Employee Committees and Increasing Em-
ployee Free Choice, 28 SYRACUSE L. REv. 809, 818-22 (1977). Jackson argues that changed 
conditions, including increased employee sophistication and the greater strength of the American 
labor movement generally, render the per se rule unnecessary in today's labor relations climate. 
See id. at 822-26. 
76. While it is true that many employers remain firmly dedicated to keeping their workers 
unorganized, the number of organized workers attests to the acceptance of independent labor 
unions as a legitimate participant in the American industrial relations system. A recent Bureau 
of Labor Statistics study (1980) recorded union membership at more than 22 million workers. 
Adams, Changing Employment Patterns of Organized· Workers, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Feb. 
1985, at 25, 25. While union membership as a percentage of the total workforce has declined in 
recent years, much of the decrease can be attributed to the general shift of jobs to service-related 
industries, which are traditionally nonunion. See R. BERENBEIM, THE DECLINING MARKET 
FOR UNIONIZATION 5 (1978). . 
77. Since the NLRA was passed in 1935, § 8(a)(2) cases have gradually become a less signifi-
cant component of unfair labor practice charges as a whole. In 1938, 19.5% of all unfair labor 
practice complaints were based on § 8(a)(2). In the 1940s, that percentage declined to below 
10% and by 1981 stood below 3%. See Note, supra note 69, at 515 n.46; 46 NLRB ANN. REP. 
176 (1981). During this period, the subject matter of typical 8(a)(2) complaints has changed as 
well. Originally, most 8(a)(2) cases involved the classic company union structures for which the 
legislation was designed. See, e.g., 2 NLRB ANN. REP., supra note 70, at 95-104. More recent 
cases tend to involve competing unions, or employer recognition of minority unions. See cases 
cited in notes 78-79 infra; see also Midwest Piping Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945). 
78. See, e.g., Ford Bros., Inc., 263 N.L.R.B. 92 (1982). 
79. See, e.g., Farmers Energy Corp., 266 N.L.R.B. 722 (1983), enforced, 730 F.2d 1098 (7th 
Cir. 1984). Under the doctrine established by the Board in Midwest Piping Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 
1060 (1945), it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to recognize one of two or more 
competing unions after one of the unions has submitted a representation petition to the Board. 
80. See notes 136-43 infra and accompanying text. 
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to be represented by organized labor than when employees choose to 
work with management in a more cooperative setting.81 If employees 
feel more comfortable in a setting of labor-management cooperation, 
or if they have philosophical objections to union organization but still 
wish to discuss employment-related matters with their employers, the 
Act does not prohibit them from doing so. By refusing to distinguish 
management efforts to "cooperate" with employees from management 
"support" and "domination" of employee organizations, the Board 
and some courts have, perhaps unintentionally, inhibited employees' 
exercise of free choice. Thus, the per se rule can work to contradict the 
policy of the NLRA by denying employees the right to choose cooper-
ative modes of contact with their employers. 82 
III. NEW APPROACHES TO SECTIONS 2(5) AND 8(a)(2): 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PARTICIPATORY MANAGEMENT 
Traditional analysis under sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) leaves little, if 
any, opportunity for employers to initiate participatory management 
techniques in nonunion settings. 83 Labor-management committees, 
QWL projects, QC circles, and employee production teams all involve 
groups of employees meeting with management to discuss specific 
81. In Cabot Carbon, the Supreme Court indicated that in nonunion settings some employer-
employee cooperation regarding grievances is permissible: 
[Section 9(a) of the NLRA provides that] any individual employee or group of employees 
shall have the right personally to present their own grievances to their employer, and to 
have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of any bargaining representative, as 
long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of any collective bargaining con-
tract then in effect, provided that the bargaining representative, if there is one, has been 
given an opportunity to be present. 
360 U.S. at 218 (emphasis added). Thus the Court suggested that the Act should not be read to 
prohibit employees, simply because they lack formal representation, from communicating with 
their employer to resolve problems of mutual concern. 
82. Some commentators have argued that employer-controlled participatory management 
systems should be prohibited even if they increase worker satisfaction, because they force em-
ployees to depend upon the good will of management: 
Employees [who belong to employer-implemented production teams] are involved not be-
cause they have a right to participate or because they have the strength to demand recogni-
tion; instead, they are involved because the employer has invited them to participate. In 
short, the ultimate protection of their interests is traceable not to their own strength but to 
the benevolence of their employer. 
Note, supra note 35, at 537. In other words, because management retains ultimate control over 
the teams, employees should not be allowed to avail themselves of the added satisfaction offered 
by increased participation in management decisionmaking. This argument fails for several rea-
sons. First, employers retain "ultimate control" over all nonunion employees under the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine. Employees formed into teams are no more subject to employer control 
than ordinary employees. If anything, team members are less subject to employer control, since 
management may hesitate to intervene in team operations for fear of hampering team effective-
ness. Second, this argument erroneously assumes that employees are unable to decide for them-
selves when a particular organizational form poses a threat to them. Moreover, the argument 
implies that employees are powerless pawns at the mercy of employer "benevolence." Employees 
in employer-implemented production teams are hardly powerless; at all times they retain the 
right to seek outside representation if they become dissatisfied with team operation. 
83. See notes 63-65 supra and accompanying text. 
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workplace issues. It is both difficult and potentially counterproductive 
to confine the discussions of these groups, particularly labor-manage-
ment committees, to matters which lie outside the scope of section 
2(5). 84 A labor-management committee which cannot discuss general 
employee "grievances" or specific "conditions of work" may be left 
with very little to discuss. QWL projects face similar barriers under 
the traditional approach: to "improve" the quality of working life, the 
"conditions of work" must somehow change. But under Cabot Car-
bon, employees who participate in a QWL project could be considered 
a "labor organization" if they discuss "conditions of work" with man-
agement. 85 Thus, if an employer helps in the formation of or provides 
assistance to a QWL project, he is guilty of an unfair labor practice 
under the traditional approach. 
A. New Standards Under Section 2(5) 
The harshness of the traditional approach has motivated the Sixth 
Circuit and the NLRB to loosen the restrictions of section 2(5) when 
applied to certain participatory management techniques. This depar-
ture from the Cabot Carbon doctrine, although limited thus far, may 
provide an important theoretical basis in future litigation involving 
participatory management. 
In NLRB v. Streamway Division of the Scott & Fetzer Co., 86 the 
Sixth Circuit read the Supreme Court's decision in Cabot Carbon nar-
rowly, concluding that some participatory management organizations 
can be distinguished from section 2(5) labor organizations. In Scott & 
Fetzer, the company established an "in-plant representation commit-
tee" for its employees. The company's avowed purpose in establishing 
the committee was "to provide an informal yet orderly process for 
communicating Company plans and programs; defining and identify-
ing problem areas and eliciting suggestions and ideas for improving 
operations."87 In other words, the committee functioned much like a 
QC circle, providing a mechanism for employees to participate in 
management's efforts to improve quality control and productivity.88 
The Board found that the committee was a labor organization 
under section 2(5), and that the company had dominated and inter-
fered with the formation of the committee· in violation of section 
8(a)(2). 89 The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the committee was 
84. See text at notes 19-20 supra. 
85. 360 U.S. at 213-14. 
86. 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982), denying enforcement to 249 N.L.R.B. 396 (1980). 
87. 691 F.2d at 289. 
88. See notes 24-29 supra and accompanying text (describing typical QC circle functions). 
89. 249 N.L.R.B. 396 (1980), enforcement denied, 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982). The Board 
had little difficulty concluding that the committee was a "labor organization": 
['The employer's] testimony clearly indicates that working conditions were something the 
representatives were supposed to talk about in the meetings. . . . It is further clear that [the 
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not a labor organization as defined in section 2(5), and thus the com-
pany could not even be charged with an unfair labor practice under 
section 8(a)(2).90 In distinguishing Cabot Carbon, the court observed 
that the limits of section 2(5)'s "dealing with" language had never 
been completely defined. That is, although Cabot Carbon dictated that 
"dealing with" can be more extensive than "bargaining with," it did 
not discuss whether some employee committee activities might not 
even be considered "dealing[s] with" at all.91 The court then felt free 
to define the lower boundaries of "dealing with." 
The most important facet of the Sixth Circuit's clarification of 
"dealing with" was the court's examination of the employee group's 
operational practices. When an "active, ongoing association between 
management and employees" is involved, it is likely that the employee 
group will be considered a labor organization.92 Factors that suggest a 
lack of dealings include the parties' own view of the employee organi-
zation, and whether there is any evidence of anti-union animus on the 
employer's part.93 In Scott & Fetzer, the court found that all of these 
employer] intended the members of the committee to act in a "representative" capac-
ity .... It matters not that only one grievance, vacations, was actually adjusted at the 
meetings. The [committee] was established by [the employer] for the ostensible purpose of 
securing adjustments in terms and conditions of employment, and the inhibiting effect upon 
employees, and therefore the violation is clear. 
249 N.L.R.B. at 400-01. 
90. 691 F.2d at 291. 
91. In arguing that Cabot Carbon did not completely define the boundaries of§ 2(5), the 
Sixth Circuit said: 
Although Justice Whitaker [in Cabot Carbon] stressed the continuous course of contacts 
between the committee and both local and central management, and stated that "dealing" 
often involves making recommendations, he did not indicate the limitations, if any, upon the 
meaning of "dealing" under the statute. Because the Supreme Court has not spoken further 
on this issue, the question of how much interaction is necessary before dealing is found is 
unresolved. 
Scott & Fetzer, 691 F.2d at 292. 
92. Scott & Fetzer, 691 F.2d at 294. The court has been criticized for the failure to distin-
guish Cabot Carbon on any "principled basis." Hogler, Employee Involvement Programs and 
NLRB v. Scott & Fetzer Co.: The Developing Interpretation of Section 8(a)(2), 35 LAB, L.J. 21, 
27 (1984). But Hogler fails to give sufficient weight to the court's efforts to distinguish the em-
ployee committees at issue in Scott & Fetzer from committees designed to represent employees in 
relations with their employer: 
[U]nless employees are encouraged "in the mistaken belief that [a committee is] truly repre-
sentative and afford[s] an agency for collective bargaining," no interference with employee 
choice, essential to a finding that the Act has been violated, occurs. The Board offers no 
evidence that anyone viewed the committee as anything more than a communicative device. 
Scott & Fetzer, 691 F.2d at 295 (quoting Federiµ-Mogul Corp. v. NLRB, 394 F.2d 915, 918 (6th 
Cir. 1968)) (citation omitted). 
93. Scott & Fetzer, 691 F.2d at 294-95. The court also implied that a standard using lan-
guage similar to that in § 9(a), see notes 57-64 supra and accompanying text, should be em-
ployed: "[T]he continuous rotation of committee members to ensure that many employees 
participate makes the Committee resemble more closely the employee groups speaking directly to 
management on an individual, rather than a representative, basis ...• " 691 F.2d at 294-95. 
The court did not specifically mention § 9(a), perhaps because Cabot Carbon appears to render 
that section irrelevant to § 2(5) determinations. See NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 
215-18 (1959); see also note 61 supra and accompanying text. 
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factors suggested that the "in-plant representation committee" was no 
more than a "communicative device" through which employees and 
management could discuss matters of mutual concem.94 
Dissatisfaction with the traditional approach to section 2(5) cases 
is not confined to the Sixth Circuit. In the past decade, the Board has 
itself created two limited exceptions to traditional section 2(5) analy-
sis. The first exception excludes from the statutory definition of "labor 
organization" programs that include all of a plant's employees.95 
When all of a plant's employees participate in a program, they are not 
being represented; thus, the Board argues, the employee group falls 
outside the boundaries of a labor organization.96 This approach, if 
generally accepted, would allow employee production teams and QWL 
programs to operate outside the constraints of the NLRA, since these 
types of programs typically involve all of a plant's employees. But 
other participatory techniques, such as some labor-management com-
mittees, do not come under this exception because they involve the 
selection of employee representatives, not the direct participation of 
every employee. 
The Board's second exception to traditional section 2(5) analysis 
involves the extent to which the employer delegates managerial au-
thority to the employee group. For example, some employers have set 
up committees that resolve grievances presented by individual employ-
ees. When these committees are allowed to exercise their function un-
fettered by management supervision, the Board has held that they do 
not "deal with" management under section 2(5).97 Instead, the Board 
considers such a committee to be exercising its authority indepen-
dently from management. This independence theoretically precludes 
94. 691 F.2d at 295. 
95. See General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977); Fibers Materials, Inc., 228 
N.L.R.B. 933 (1977). 
96. The General Foods case involved management's organization of its employees in a pet 
food plant into employee production teams. For a description of a similar organization structure 
at another General Foods plant, see note 33 supra and accompanying text. The administrative 
law judge's opinion, later enforced by the Board, clearly distinguished the structure of employee 
production teams from that of § 2(5) labor organizations: 
In their essence, the teams, and each of them, are nothing more or less than work crews 
established by [the company] as administrative subdivisions of its entire employee comple-
ment at the Gaines Nutrition Center. It is virtually uncontested that [the company's] origi-
nal purpose in establishing these crews had nothing to do with labor relations, as that term 
is generally understood. . . . 
A team could not be a bargaining agent because it lacked the structure and capacity to 
be an organization or an agent of any kind. No team had a team spokesman. At every team 
meeting, those who spoke did so on their own behalf and in their own individual capacities. 
If such a set of circumstances should give rise to the existence of a labor organization, no 
employer could ever have a staff conference without bringing forth a labor organization in 
its midst. 
General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1234-35 (1977). 
91. See Mercy-Memorial Hosp. Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1977); Spark's Nugget, Inc., 230 
N.L.R.B. 275 (1977), enforced in part and denied in part sub nom., NLRB v. Silver Spur Casino, 
623 F.2d 571 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 906 (1981). 
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the notion that the committee could "deal with" management.98 
Labor-management committees99 that confine themselves largely 
to the resolution of individual employee grievances may be permissible 
under this theory. However, most labor-management committees 
given the power to set their own agendas100 would find it difficult to 
limit the scope of their discussions to come under this exception. 
B. Developing a Less Restrictive Doctrine in 8(a)(2) Cases: The 
Chicago Rawhide Approach 
While attempts to limit the application of section 2(5) to par-
ticipatory management programs have only recently met with success, 
a more flexible interpretation of section 8(a)(2) has been developing for 
almost three decades. 101 Faced with the changing nature of section 
98. But see Note, supra note 38, at 1671-72: 
The Board's conclusion, that an employee committee that is on its face an organ of manage-
ment cannot be a labor organization within the meaning of the Act, seems logical. In prac-
tice, however, it is difficult to distinguish between deciding matters of managerial perogative 
and dealing with management. For example, in [Spark's Nugget], the Board found that an 
"Employees' Council" that was composed of two representatives of management and one 
designated employee and that handled all workers' grievances was not a labor organization. 
In this sort of structure, however, the lone employee on the committee probably functioned 
more as an advocate for aggrieved employees than as a managerial decisionmaker; and such 
advocacy seems to fall well within the meaning of "dealing with" management. 
(emphasis in original) (citations omitted). In a more recent case, the Board displayed no diffi-
culty drawing the distinction between managerial delegation of authority and managerial negotia-
tion with employees. In Lawson Co., 267 N.L.R.B. 463 (1983), enforced, 753 F.2d 471 (6th Cir. 
1985), an employer contended that employee groups it had established in response to an outside 
union's organizational drive were in fact not representative, but rather were merely "quality 
circles" or "communications vehicles." The administrative law judge quickly dismissed the com-
pany's contention: 
The [employer's] witnesses referred to the direct dealing with the employee committee it 
created as a "quality circle," an advisory council, a quality council, a communication vehi-
cle, a sales assistant council, a contract relationship, etc., etc., page after page of technical 
synonyms that in no sense change the plain facts. Were I now to respond to all these fanci-
ful wordings of the witnesses, this Decision, too, would go on and on and the true objective 
of the Respondent - to kill off the union movement permanently - would be furthered, 
rather than arrested, as the statute commands. 
267 N.L.R.B. at 472. The Board upheld the judge's opinion, but in doing so suggested that it 
might permit employers to operate genuine QC circles: 
We shall ••. [require] ..• that Respondent withdraw recognition from and disestablish 
the employee committee. We note that the purpose of this requirement is to remove the 
taint of Respondent's unlawful formation and domination of the sales assistants committee 
. . . ; it is not based on the operation of any "quality circle" program Respondent may 
currently be conducting. 
267 N.L.R.B. at 463 n.5. Although not controlling, this language suggests that, in future cases 
involving participatory management, the Board will concentrate on the employer's motivations, 
and the effect of the organization's formation on the employees' desire to unionize, rather than 
on the form of the employee group itself. If this occurs, genuine, good-faith efforts by employers 
to share managerial power with employees will be more likely to survive § 8(a){2) challenges. 
99. See notes 16-20 supra and accompanying text. 
100. See text at note 19 supra (item 4). 
101. For a discussion of the early development of§ 8{a)(2) doctrine, see Note, supra note 69, 
at 519-25; Note, Section 8(a)(2): Employer Assistance to Plant Unions and Committees, 9 STAN. 
L. REv. 351 {1957). 
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8(a)(2) cases in the 1950s, the Seventh Circuit developed a new test for 
determining permissible levels of employer involvement in employee 
labor organizations. The court rejected the per se approach, 102 concen-
trating instead on the issue of whether employee free choice had actu-
ally been restricted by management's actions. 103 Several courts have 
followed the Seventh Circuit's lead. While this development has led to 
the successful defense of several participatory schemes against 8(a)(2) 
attacks, the disagreement among the courts has produced uncertainty 
as to how the law will be applied to any given participatory 
technique.104 
The court first employed the actual domination test in Chicago 
Rawhide Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB. 105 That case involved several 
employees' committees, one of which later became the workers' recog-
nized bargaining agent. The NLRB, responding to a complaint from a 
union which had unsuccessfully tried to organize the plant, found that 
the company had violated section 8(a)(2) "[b]y assisting, contributing 
support to, and interfering with the administration of" several em-
ployee committees which had existed at the plant during the union's 
organizational drive. 106 The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting that the 
idea for the committee had originated with the employees, the em-
ployer's support had been minimal, and the employer's limited in-
volvement had not been a response to the outside union's organizing 
efforts. 107 
As the Seventh Circuit continued to follow its permissive approach 
to 8(a)(2) cases, 108 a few other circuits also began to question the 
102. For a discussion of the per se approach, see notes 71-82 supra and accompanying text. 
103. See notes 10S-16 infra and accompanying text. 
104. To date, four circuits have adopted some form of the "actual domination" test. See, 
e.g., Classic Indus. v. NLRB, 667 F.2d 20S (1st Cir. 1981); Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, S03 
F.2d 62S (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 87S (197S); Modem Plastics v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 
201 (6th Cir. 1967); Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 16S (7th Cir. 19S5); cf. 
NLRB v. Keller Ladders S., Inc., 40S F.2d 663 (Sth Cir. 1968) (acknowledging validity of Chi-
cago Rawhide in dictum); NLRB v. Grand Foundries, Inc., 362 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1966) (same). 
Other circuits and the Board, by contrast, have consistently held that any employer assistance to 
or cooperation with an employee labor organization violates § 8(a)(2). See, e.g., Fire Alert Co., 
182 N.L.R.B. 910 (1970), enforced, NLRB v. Fire Alert Co., 6S Lab. Cas. (CCH) ~ 11,874 (10th 
Cir. 1971); NLRB v. General Precision, Inc., 381 F.2d 61, 66 (3d Cir.) (employer support of 
employee "administration committee," set up to determine pension plan eligibility, leaves "no 
substantial factual questions in dispute" regarding § 8(a)(2) violation) cert. denied, 389 U.S. 974 
(1974); Irving Air Chute Co. v. NLRB, 3S0 F.2d 176, 180 (2d Cir. 196S) (employer support of 
employee labor organizations violates § 8(a)(2) "even absent company domination"); Interna-
tional Union of United Brewery, Flour, Cereal, Soft Drink & Distillery Workers v. NLRB, 298 
F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (employer required to withdraw recognition from unlawfully assisted 
"Employee Association" pending Board certification), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 843 (1962); cf. 
NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. S84, S96-97 (1941) (Courts of Appeals may not substitute their 
judgment for that of the Board on factual questions regarding the level of employer domination). 
10S. 221 F.2d 16S (7th Cir. 195S). 
106. Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co., 10S N.L.R.B. 727, 738 (19S3). 
107. 221 F.2d at 167-70. 
108. See Continental Distilling Sales Co. v. NLRB, 348 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 196S); NLRB v. 
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Board's continued inflexibility in employer domination cases. The 
First, 109 Sixth, 110 and Ninth 111 Circuits have all permitted some forms 
of employer cooperation with employee labor organizations, often cit-
ing Chicago Rawhide with approval. The other circuits, however, con-
tinue to follow the Board's less flexible approach.112 
Two factors dominate the Chicago Rawhide analysis. First, the in-
quiry focuses on whether "employee free choice" has been restricted 
by management's actions. Employer domination or support is defined 
by the degree to which it interferes with the employees' freedom to 
choose an independent bargaining representative. 113 The second fac-
tor is derived from the view that increased cooperation between em-
ployees and management is an important policy behind the NLRA. 
Under the cooperative model of labor relations, courts distinguish 
"mere cooperation" from "support."114 Section 8(a)(2) prohibits 
"support,"115 but cooperation is encouraged by the Act's stated pur-
pose and underlying policies. 116 
Chicago Rawhide's concentration on employee free choice and en-
hanced labor-management cooperation in practice allowed only mini-
mal employer support of employee labor organizations. 117 Recent 
cases have gone further, permitting employers to allow meetings on 
Magic Slacks, Inc., 314 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Post Publishing Co., 311 F.2d 565 
(7th Cir. 1962). But see NLRB v. Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, Inc., 305 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 
1962) (evidence sufficient to support finding of employer domination under 8(a)(2)). 
109. See, e.g., Classic Ind. v. NLRB, 667 F.2d 205 (1st Cir. 1981). 
110. See, e.g., Modem Plastics v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967). 
111. See, e.g., Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 
U.S. 875. 
112. See note 104 supra. 
113. The Chicago Rawhide court's description of the actual domination test demonstrates the 
importance of employee free choice in this analysis: 
Words, and actions which might dominate the employees in their choice of a bargaining 
agent do not constitute domination proscribed by the Act unless the employees are actually 
dominated. . . . "The test of whether an employee organization is employer controlled is 
not an objective one but rather subjective from the standpoint of the employees." 
221 F.2d at 167-68 (quoting NLRB v. Sharples Chems., 209 F.2d 645, 652 (6th Cir. 1954)) 
(emphasis added). 
114. Oft-quoted language from Chicago Rawhide first detailed the distinction between "sup-
port" and "cooperation": · 
A line must be drawn • . . between support and cooperation. Support, even though inno-
cent, can be identified because it constitutes at least some degree of control or influence. 
Cooperation only assists the employees or their bargaining representative in carrying out 
their independent intention. If this line between cooperation and support is not recognized, 
the employer's fear of accusations of domination may defeat the principal purpose of the 
Act, which is cooperation between management and labor. 
221 F.2d at 167. 
115. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1982). The Chicago Rawhide court reasoned that 
"'(s]upport' is proscribed because, as a practical matter, it cannot be separated from influence." 
221 F.2d at 167. 
116. See notes 132-43 infra and accompanying text. 
117. Only minimal levels of employer "cooperation" are permitted because minimal support 
is unlikely to affect employee free choice. 
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company time and property, 118 provide printing and secretarial serv-
ices, 119 and even oversee election procedures120 for employee labor or-
ganizations. Such levels of employer assistance would have been clear 
violations of the Act under its traditional interpretation.121 However, 
since the Chicago Rawhide approach has not become generally ac-
cepted doctrine, 122 some jurisdictions continue to forbid all forms of 
employer assistance to employee labor organizations, and new forms 
of labor-management cooperation are still subject to challenge in all 
jurisdictions. 
C. Implications for Participatory Management 
The Chicago Rawhide approach, by allowing minimal levels of em-
ployer-employee cooperation, thus permits the legal operation of some 
aspects of participatory management systems. For example, meetings 
on company time are permissible under Chicago Rawhide absent ac-
tual employer domination of employee freedom to choose an in-
dependent bargaining representative.123 The operation of labor-
management committees, QC circles, and the like always involves 
meetings, and management usually cannot convince employees to par-
ticipate unless that participation takes place on company time and 
property. Thus, if employer involvement is limited enough to preclude 
a finding of actual domination, courts that follow Chicago Rawhide 
would likely allow a participatory management system to survive a 
challenge under section 8(a)(2).124 
Most types of participatory management, however, require a great 
deal of employer involvement at the outset.125 Employers often sug-
gest participatory management to employees in hopes that productiv-
ity will increase.126 Employees may agree to participate for an entirely 
different reason: a desire to make their jobs more meaningful and en-
joyable.127 For participatory management to be successful, the em-
ployer must often convince the employees of the need for greater 
participation.128 Thus, in many cases it is difficult to argue that the 
employer has not "interfered with" the "formation" of an employee 
118. See NLRB v. Magic Slacks, Inc., 314 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1963). 
119. See Hotpoint Co. v. NLRB, 289 F.2d 683 (7th Cir. 1961). 
120. See Modern Plastics v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967). 
121. See notes 69-72 supra and accompanying text. 
122. See note 104 supra. 
123. See notes 113-18 supra and accompanying text. 
124. See, e.g., NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208 (1st Cir. 1979). 
125. See W. OUCHI, supra note 3, at 97-129. 
126. See note 29 supra; see also note 35 supra and accompanying text. 
127. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text. 
128. See W. OUCHI, supra note 3, at 97-129 and passim. 
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participatory "labor organization."129 
Therefore, the Chicago Rawhide interpretation of section 8(a)(2), 
though desirable as a means of encouraging labor-management coop-
eration, does not offer a legal basis for courts consistently to allow 
participatory management programs. By contrast, allowing par-
ticipatory groups to remain outside the realm of section 2(5) alto-
gether, as in Scott & Fetzer, offers a more consistent and defensible 
legal framework for the operation of participatory management sys-
tems. A mechanism for increasing the power of employees over their 
work environment through increased participation in management 
simply does not resemble a labor organization, whether it be a tradi-
tional labor union or a company union. Unions exist in large part 
because of a perceived lack of employee power;130 it makes little sense 
to prevent employees from gaining power just because that increased 
power might obviate their desire for traditional union represen-
tation.131 
IV. PARTICIPATORY MANAGEMENT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF 
FEDERAL LABOR POLICY 
Despite evidence that workers derive more enjoyment and satisfac-
tion from their employment when they participate in management, 132 
the Board and many courts remain reluctant to allow participatory 
innovations in the workplace. The courts often express no hostility 
toward participatory management itself, but insist that the policies un-
derlying the NLRA demand limitations on such programs.133 Such 
conclusions ignore an important goal of federal labor legislation: to 
promote cooperation between management and labor. Although the 
129. Indeed, in many cases it is so obvious that employer domination has occurred that the 
dispositive issue is whether or not a § 2(5) labor organization has been created. See note 66 supra 
and accompanying text. 
130. A major justification for the NLRA's protection of collective bargaining is the "inequal• 
ity of bargaining power between employees ..• and employers." 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982). 
131. Many union leaders oppose participatory management programs, even those (such as 
QWL programs) designed to promote employee satisfaction. See, e.g., Delamotte, Union Atti-
tudes Toward Quality of Working Life, in THE QUALITY OF WORKING LIFE 405 (L. Davis & A. 
Chems eds. 1975). Union opposition to participatory management can be explained by the gen-
eral atmosphere of distrust which exists between the leaders of American labor and management. 
See notes 36-38 supra and accompanying text. Union leaders may also be acting to forestall the 
threat participatory management poses for the preservation of organized labor's power over em-
ployees, or out of a genuine concern that employees are being coerced by management to reject 
unions and accept instead a limited managerial role. Of course, the requirement of actual domi-
nation under Chicago Rawhide is designed to prohibit coercion by management; only benign 
cooperation is permitted. 
132. See, e.g .• D. JENKINS, supra note 4, at 171-72 (discussing R. LIKERT, NEW PATTERNS 
OF MANAGEMENT (1961)); W. OUCHI, supra note 3, at 43. This is one aspect of participatory 
management about which both management theorists, supra note 3, and those who advocate 
economic democracy for its own sake, supra note 4, tend to agree. 
133. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 
(1971). 
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NLRA guarantees employees the right to choose an adversarial model 
of relations with their employer, it does not require them to do so. As 
long as the right of employees to self-organization is preserved, 134 
nothing in the NLRA or any other federal law mandates that employ-
ees and management may not cooperate with one another when both 
parties agree that such an arrangement would be mutually beneficial. 
An examination of the legislative history of the NLRA and other 
federal labor legislation further suggests that Congress never intended 
to bar labor-management cooperation outside the scope of collective 
bargaining. Even during the deliberations that led to the passage of 
the Wagner Act in 1935, the primary concern was the protection of 
individual employee rights, not the preservation at any cost of "collec-
. tive bargaining as an industrial system."135 
A. The Wagner Act 
The purpose of the Wagner Act is clearly stated in the Act's first 
section - "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bar-
gaining. "136 In a general sense, much of the disagreement over the 
Act's purpose137 stems from the intended scope of "encourage." If the 
use of "encourage" was intended to discourage nonadversarial modes 
of industrial relations, then participatory management would seem to 
contradict the Act's policy. · 
However, the Act's legislative history indicates that the adversary 
model of labor relations was not intended to be the exclusive avenue 
for employer-employee communications. First of all, Senator Wagner, 
the architect of the Act, introduced the original version of the bill with 
a speech describing several subject areas in which employer-employee 
cooperation might be permissible.138 Furthermore, at the hearings on 
134. The prohibition of employer unfair labor practices in § 8(a) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(l)-(5) (1982), is designed to protect employees in their exercise of their rights as enu-
merated in § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). The employees' § 7 rights include "the right to self-
organization ... and the right to refrain from [self-organization]" (emphasis added). 
135. Cf. Note, supra note 38, at 1662, 1673-80. 
136. 29 u.s.c. § 151 (1982). 
137. Compare Note, supra note 38, at 1673-80, with Jackson, supra note 75, at 834-38. 
138. See l LEG. Hlsr. NLRA, supra note 39, at 16: 
The bill which I am introducing today forbids any employer to foster or participate in or 
influence any organization which deals with problems that should be covered by a genuine 
labor union. At the same time it does not prevent employers from forming or assisting 
associations which exist to promote the health or general welfare of workers, to provide 
group insurance, or for other similar purposes. Employer-controlled organizations should 
be allowed to serve their proper function of supplementing trade unionism, but they should 
not be allowed to supplant or destroy it. 
Although there is a difference between health insurance and a plan which seeks directly to dis-
cuss working conditions, this passage does suggest that the Wagner Act's proponents did not 
envision a per se prohibition of employer-employee cooperation. But see NLRB v. General Preci-
sion, Inc., 381 F.2d 61, 66 (3d Cir.) (employer domination of employee committee set up to 
determine pension plan eligibility violated § 8(a)(2)), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 974 (1967). It is 
significant that consideration of the bill began with a statement that the Act should not prohibit 
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the proposed bill, a parade of employers and employees testified that 
while some employer-dominated employee organizations were abusive 
restrictions of employee freedom to organize, others served the useful 
purpose of promoting cooperative and harmonious relations between 
the parties.139 As a result, the Senate attempted to strike a balance 
between the cooperative and adversarial approaches.140 
While the original version of the Wagner Act, first introduced in 
1934, was substantially altered before its eventual passage in 1935,141 
the Senate Report on the final version of the bill indicates that Con-
gress specifically intended to allow some forms of employer-employee 
cooperation during working hours. 142 Moreover, during consideration 
all employer-assisted organizations which involve employees. Arguably, some forms of par-
ticipatory management, particularly those that emphasize employee satisfaction, should be inter-
preted as organizations designed "to promote . . • the general welfare" of employees, and not as 
attempts to "supplant or destroy" trade unionism. 
139. See, e.g., Statement of Eugene Roderick, reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. NLRA, supra note 
39, at 878-79; Statement of James Moore, reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. NLRA, supra note 39, at 
879-80; Statement of Martin Murphy, reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. NLRA, supra note 39, at 880-82; 
Statement of C.W. Conn, reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. NLRA, supra note 39, at 882-900. 
140. S. 2926 (the Labor Disputes Act), the 1934 version of the Wagner Act, originally con-
tained the following precursor to § 8(a)(2): 
Sec. 3: It shall be an unfair labor practice -
(3) For an employer to interfere with or dominate the administration of any labor organiza-
tion or contribute financial support to it: Provided, That • • . an employer shall not be 
prohibited from permitting an employee, individually, or local representatives of employees, 
from conferring among themselves or with management during working hours without loss 
of time while engaged in the business of a labor organization. 
S. 2926, as reported, 2d Senate Print, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1934), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. 
NLRA at 1070, 1087. The Senate Report described the compromise the language was intended 
to strike: 
[Section 3(3)] is one that the committee has considered with great care. There was 
presented to the committee much testimony . . . that a few employers had dominated labor 
organizations of their own employees by dictating the terms of their constitutions and by-
laws [etc.] .... These practices and others of the same character are clearly abusive and 
should not be allowed to continue in the few instances where they have existed. 
Yet these abuses do not seem to the committee so general that the Government should 
forbid employees to indulge in the normal relations and innocent communications which are 
part of the friendly relations between employer and employee. The policy of the govern-
ment is founded upon the theory of democratic collective bargaining, not upon the theory of 
class war . . . . And democratic collective bargaining means the exchange of ideas no less 
than the exchange of services, goods, or money. The object [of§ 3(3)] is to remove from the 
industrial scene unfair pressure, not fair discussion. 
S. REP. No. 1184, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. NLRA, supra note 39, at 
1099, 1104. 
141. However, only minor alterations were made in § 3(3) of S. 2926, which in the final 
version became § 8(2), codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2). See note 13 supra. 
142. S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST. NLRA, supra note 
39, at 2300, 2309-10: 
It is impossible to catalog all the practices that might constitute interference [under § 8(2)], 
which may rest upon subtle but conscious economic pressure exerted by virtue of the em-
ployment relationship. The question is one of fact in each case. . . . [T]he committee has 
been extremely careful not to work injustice by carrying these strictures too far. To deny 
absolutely by law the right of employees to confer with management during working hours 
without loss of time or pay would interrupt the very negotiations which it is the object of 
this bill to promote. 
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of the bill on the Senate floor, further emphasis was given to employee 
freedom of choice as to whether and how to be represented, not to 
collective bargaining as an exclusive system for the resolution of indus-
trial conflict. 143 
Congressional intent to emphasize employee freedom of choice as 
the reason for prohibiting employer domination of employee labor or-
ganizations144 fully supports the Chicago Rawhide approach to section 
8(a)(2) cases.145 Indeed, several members of Congress expressed con-
cern during consideration of the Wagner Act that a mechanical appli-
cation of section 8(a)(2) would frustrate the Act's purpose of 
encouraging employers and employees to resolve their differences 
without resort to the economic weaponry of strikes and lockouts. In 
response, the bill's proponents referred to the proviso in section 8(a)(2) 
which specifically permits joint employer-employee conferences during 
working time. The per se approach inhibits efforts at even noncoercive 
employer-employee communication. It also prevents the type of coop-
eration, exemplified by participatory management, which can play an 
important role in furthering the Act's purpose of preventing industrial 
strife. 
Analyzing the history of section 2(5) of the Wagner Act leads to 
the same conclusion. The original version of section 2(5) differed in 
two important respects from the section as enacted. The proposed bill, 
like the final version, attempted to define "labor organization" 
Clearly, then, Congress did not intend to establish a per se prohibition of employer-employee 
cooperation outside of union contexts. That such an approach arose indicates that the Board and 
the courts declined to follow Congress's instructions to treat the question as "one of fact in each 
case." 
143. See, e.g., 19 CONG. REC. 7650, reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST. NLRA, supra note 39, at 
2321, 2350 (statement of Sen. Borah): 
It has been stated over and over again by the critics of the bill that the bill prohibits the 
company union. There is nothing in the bill which prohibits a group of men coming to-
gether and organizing a company union if they themselves, the workers, desire a company 
union .... I want to see the workingman free to join a union or to remain out of a union. I 
want workingmen.free to form any kind of a union if it is freely formed; that is, formed of 
the free will of the employees. This bill does not do what so many seem to think. 
(Emphasis added). 
144. See, e.g., the following interchange between Senator Wagner and Arthur Torrey, an 
employer advocate: 
Senator WAGNER: [I]s there anything in this bill which interferes with that relation-
ship of the workers in a particular plant, if they do not care to bargain collectively, but want 
to bargain individually? There is nothing in the legislation to prevent them. All I can see is 
that if they do, as workers, want to organize and bargain collectively, they may do so. 
Mr. TORREY: The practical effect of the legislation would, I feel certain be an interfer-
ence with that preference on the part of employees to bargain individually ..•. 
Senator WAGNER: [Alli that we are attempting to do is to make the worker a free 
man, so that he may be permitted to bargain collectively, even though he may encounter an 
employer . . . who does not believe in labor organizations and won't deal with any labor 
organizations, or any organization of workers, call it what you will. There isn't anything 
here at all that does any more than give the worker freedom. 
Hearings on S. 2926, (testimony of Arthur Morris Torrey), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. NLRA, 
supra note 39, at 27, 516. 
145. See text at notes 105-16 supra. 
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broadly, so as to include more than traditional labor unions. 146 The 
enacted version contained additional language which specifically de-
fined "employee representation plans" as labor organizations.147 Simi-
larly, the subject-matter restrictions in section 2(5) of the final bill 
were more inclusive than those appearing in the proposed bill. 148 
As proposed, section 2(5) defined "labor organization" to include 
"any organization, labor union, association, corporation, or society of 
any kind" through which employees discussed certain matters with 
their employers.149 In apparent response to concerns, expressed dur-
ing hearings on the bill, that this language would not encompass some 
employer-dominated150 company unions,151 an amended version of the 
bill introduced in early 1935 specifically included "any agency or em-
ployee representation committee or plan" in the definition. 152 Senator 
Wagner explained the change as necessary to prevent nullification of 
the Act's attempt to eliminate employer-dominated company unions, 
which were often labeled "employee representation committees."153 
Congress apparently agreed, including the amended language in the 
146. Labor organizations were defined in § 3(5) of the Labor Disputes Act as follows: 
The term "labor organization" means any organization, labor union, association, corpora-
tion, or society of any kind in which employees participate to any degree whatsoever, which 
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, 
labor disputes, wages, or hours of employment. 
S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(5) (1934), reprinted in 1 LEG. H1sr. NLRA, supra note 39, at 1, 
2. 
147. 29 u.s.c. §152(5) (1982). 
148. See notes 156-58 infra and accompanying text. 
149. See note 146 supra. 
150. The Act sought to eliminate company unions only if they were dominated by the em-
ployer. As Senator Wagner and others emphasized, company unions formed by the employees 
free from management pressure were viewed as a valid exercise of the employees' § 7 rights. See 
Wagner, supra note 39, § 9, at 1, col. 7; see also note 143 supra. 
151. See To Create a National Labor Board: Hearings on S. 2926 Before the Senate Comm. 
on Education and Labor, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 240-44 (1934) (statement of Edwin E. Witte, Labor 
Expert, Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin), reprinted in 1 LEG. Hlsr. NLRA, 
supra note 39, at 27, 270-74. 
152. S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(5) (1935), reprinted in 1 LEG. Hlsr. NLRA, supra 
note 39, at 1295, 1296. 
153. See CoMPARISON OF s. 2926 (73d Congress) and s. 1958 (74th Congress) 22 (Comm. 
Print 1935), reprinted in 1 LEG. Hlsr. NLRA, supra note 39, at 1319, 1347: 
It has been argued frequently by employers as well as by protagonists of the bill last year 
that an employee representation plan or committee arrangement is not a labor organization 
or a union but simply a method of contact between employers and employees. But the act is 
entitled to prescribe its own definitions of labor organizations, for its own purposes, and it is 
clear that unless these plans, etc., are included in the definition, whether they merely "deal" 
or "adjust", or exist for the purpose of collective bargaining, most of the activity of employ-
ers in connection therewith which we are seeking to outlaw would fall outside the scope of 
the act. The act would thus be entirely nullified. If, as employers insist, such "plans", etc., 
are lawful representatives of employees, then employer activity relative to them should 
clearly be included. 
This language indicates that § 2(5) was intended only to regulate those employee organizations 
which are representational in nature. Because participatory management systems do not gener-
ally seek to provide representation for employees, it can be argued that it is inappropriate to 
include participatory techniques under the coverage of§ 2(5). See text at notes 181-83 infra. 
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final bill.154 
Despite the specific inclusion of representation committees in the 
Act's definition of "labor organization," participatory management 
committees155 do not necessarily fall within section 2(5). The purpose 
of participatory management committees is clearly distinguishable 
from that of employee representation committees. Participatory 
committees seek to increase employee power over matters which tradi-
tionally fall within managerial prerogatives.156 Representation com-
mittees, as their name implies, serve as representatives of employees 
before management. The purpose of representation committees is not 
to increase employee decisionmaking authority, but rather to affect de-
cisions which are still made by the employer.157 Thus the Act need 
not be construed as necessarily precluding the operation of labor-man-
agement committees outside the scope of section 2(5). 
In addition to adding the language pertaining to representation 
committees, Congress expanded the subject-matter language of the 
"labor organization" definition. The 1934 proposals listed "griev-
ances, labor disputes, wages, or hours of employment" as subjects that 
employee "labor organizations" discuss in their "dealings with" em-
ployers.158 After extensive hearings on the 1934 bill, Senator Wagner 
offered in 1935 a section 2(5) whose subject-matter requirements were 
substantially identical to the 1934 version.159 Congress then further 
expanded the subject-matter language by adding "conditions of work" 
to the list, apparently to prevent a narrow construction of the defini-
tional requirements from undermining the purpose of section 
154. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1982). 
155. See notes 18-20 supra and accompanying text. Committees are used here as an example 
because the Board and the courts frequently experience difficulty distinguishing participatory 
committees from representational committees. See, e.g., Lawson Co., 267 N.L.R.B. 463 (1983), 
where the administrative law judge (ALJ) struggled 'Yith a variety of "technical synonyms" 
before determining that an employee committee was representational enough to qualify as a 
§ 2(5) labor organization. The AU in Lawson, frustrated by a management witness's efforts to 
label the company's employee committee as a participatory "process," said: "It [the committee] 
is a technique, a method, a communication from the mind that coordinates the mental capacity 
of the human race .... But I know what a negotiating committee is and so does Board law." 
Lawson Co. v. NLRB, 753 F.2d 471, 478 (6th Cir. 1985) (emphasis omitted). 
156. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. See generally Section I supra. 
157. The Board relied upon this distinction in distinguishing employee production teams 
from representation committees. See General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232 (1977), discussed 
at note 96 supra. At least one commentator has criticized that decision, arguing that "[i]n prac-
tice . . . it is difficult to distinguish between deciding matters of managerial prerogative and 
dealing with management." See Note, supra note 38, at 1671 (emphasis in original). The Lawson 
case, however, suggests that both the Board and the courts do not find it impossible to apply the 
distinction between representational and participatory employee groups. See note 98 supra. 
158. S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(5) (1934), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. NLRA, supra note 
39, at 1, 2. See note 146 supra. 
159. The new version added "rates of pay" to the original list, apparently to ensure that 
discussion of nonhourly pay (e.g., piecework compensation) would be included. See S. 1958, 
74th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(5) (1935), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. NLRA, supra note 39 at 1295, 
1296. 
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8(a)(2).160 
Aside from expressing its general desire for a broad construction of 
section 2(5), Congress did not define "conditions of work."161 Yet it is 
precisely that language that causes the Board and most courts to treat 
participatory management organizations as labor organizations under 
the Act. Most participatory management programs are not concerned 
with the other subjects listed in section 2(5). For example, QC circles 
and employee production teams, which are usually confined to specific 
areas of production,162 are ill-equipped to discuss wages, rates of pay, 
or hours of employment. Individual employee grievances, or labor 
disputes generally, may arise tangentially in team meetings, but em-
ployee groups designed to improve product quality or worker effi-
ciency usually avoid becoming mired in the discussion of such 
potentially divisive matters. 163 
160. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935), reprinted in 2 LEG. HIST. NLRA, 
supra note 39, at 2300-06: 
The term "labor organization" is phrased very broadly in order that the independence of 
action guaranteed by section 7 of the bill and protected by section 8 shall extend to all 
organizations of employees that deal with employers in regard to "grievances, labor dis-
putes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." This definition 
includes employee-representation committees and plans in order that the employers' activi-
ties in connection therewith shall be equally subject to the application of section 8. 
Thus, the Senate clearly expressed that § 2(5) should be construed broadly so that employee 
"independence of action" under § 7 is preserved. That is, employee freedom of choice is the 
policy objective which underlies an expansive reading of § 2(5). This gives added force to the 
Sixth Circuit's novel use of employee free choice cases in the § 8(a)(2) area as support for limita• 
tions on the scope of § 2(5). But see Hogler, supra note 92, at 26-27 (arguing that in Scott & 
Fetzer, the Sixth Circuit's citation to several § 8(a)(2) cases was logically unsound). 
161. Senator Wagner maintained that the 1934 version of his bill would not "prevent em• 
ployers from forming or assisting associations which exist to promote the health or general wel• 
fare of workers, to provide group insurance, or for other similar purposes." 78 Cong. Rec. 3443 
(1934), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. NLRA, supra note 39, at 16. Other legislators suggested that 
company-sponsored unemployment insurance and employee stock ownership plans would not be 
included in the§ 2(5) definition. See S. REP. No. 1184, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1934), reprinted in 
1 LEG. HIST. NLRA, supra note 39, at 1099, 1103. These exceptions have been described as 
"vague and perhaps trivial." See Sockell, supra note 10, at 550-51. 
162. See note 26 supra and accompanying text. 
163. For example, a successful participatory program at General Motors, involving a plant-
wide QWL program and departmental QC circles, has recently lost the support of some UAW 
leaders. See Main, supra note 7, at 51: 
Even if the birth [of participatory management] is without complications, sustaining em-
ployee involvement can be tricky, especially in light of union officials' often tender sensitiv• 
ity that circles will assume some of their role as the workers' representatives. . . • [T]o keep 
the employee participation groups going, both management and workers have had to tread a 
very fine - some might say imaginary - line. "The cardinal rule here is that you don't 
discuss contractual matters in the quality-of-worklife groups," says Norman Meyer, presi• 
dent of UAW Local 699 .... 
Meyer added that "District committeemen, like supervisors, are deathly afraid of quality of 
worklife as a tlrreat to their jobs." Id. Presumably, union officials fear that QWL programs will 
make it unnecessary for employees to rely on outside unions to bargain with employers, even 
over traditionally contractual matters. That fear alone, however, does not justify declaring par-
ticipatory management a per se violation of employees' § 7 rights. Since, as Meyer states, it is a 
"cardinal rule" that QWL groups do not discuss "contractual" matters, any QWL project which 
remains within its own boundaries will not satisfy the subject-matter requirements of§ 2(5) and 
thus should not be treated as a "labor organization" under the Act. If, however, a QWL project 
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However, if "conditions of work" is construed broadly, the term 
includes nearly everything a group of employees might discuss in 
meetings with supervisors. For example, if a QC circle participant 
suggests a change in the flow of components through an assembly line, 
implementing the suggestion necessarily involves change in the nature 
and allocation of employee responsibilities. That is, in a broad sense, 
conditions of work have changed for the employees. Or to take an-
other example, an employee may suggest a change in plant tempera-
ture to prevent the breakdown of sensitive electronic machinery. 
Changing the temperature may also make the workers more (or less) 
comfortable. Again, "conditions of work" have clearly changed as the 
direct result of a meeting between the employer and its employees. 
The purpose of the employee participatory organization, however, is 
not representational, and thus the employee group should not be 
treated as a labor organization.164 
B. The Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act 
Congress retained the language of both sections 8(a)(2) and 2(5) 
when it passed the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA or Taft-
Hartley Act)165 in 1947. However, during consideration of the bills166 
which formed the basis of Taft-Hartley as enacted, the House and Sen-
ate each directly confronted the issue of labor-management commit-
tees under the Wagner Act. 
The House version (the Hartley bill)167 explicitly permitted the for-
mation and operation of labor-management committees to discuss any 
discusses matters which are traditionally considered contractual (that is, matters listed in § 2(5)), 
then the employee groups involved will be considered "labor organizations" even under the Sixth 
Circuit's approach, because the groups will then be undertaking a representational, rather than 
merely participatory, role. See notes 155-57 supra and 181-83 infra and accompanying text. 
164. The distinction between representation and participation can become blurred because of 
the similar terminology used to describe both types of employee organizations. For example, in 
both instances, the word "committee" describes the organization involved. In fact, the Scott & 
Fetzer case involved what the company had dubbed a "representation committee." Yet the Scott 
& Fetzer Company's committees were arguably not representational at all, because the employ-
ees used the committee form for an almost exclusively nonrepresentational purpose: to commu-
nicate individually with their employer. See NLRB v. Streamway Div. of the Scott & Fetzer Co., 
691 F.2d 288, 294-95 (6th Cir. 1982) ("The continuous rotation of Committee members to ensure 
that many employees participate makes the Committee resemble more closely the employee 
groups speaking directly to management on an individual, rather than a representative, basis as 
in General Foods."). See also Lawson Co. v. NLRB, 753 F.2d 471, 477 (6th Cir. 1985) ("The 
employees in [Scott & Fetzer] communicated with management on an individual rather than 
representational basis."). Therefore, the Board and the courts must look beyond labels, and 
focus on the substance and purpose of each employee organization challenged under the Act. 
165. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 
136 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-188 (1982)). 
166. The Taft-Hartley Act represents a compromise between two bills: the Hartley bill 
(passed by the House) and the Taft bill (passed by the Senate). 
167. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 31 (1948) [hereinafter cited as LEG. 
HIST. LMRA]. 
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subject, provided that the Board had not already recognized a different 
representative for those employees.168 The House Report explaining 
this provision clearly indicated that the labor-management committees 
encouraged by the federal government during World War II would be 
permitted under the proposed section. 169 
The Senate, however, substantially revised the Hartley bill in sub-
stituting its own version, the Taft bill. 170 The Taft bill did not include 
specific approval for World War II-style committees; instead, it 
amended section 9(a) of the Wagner Act to expand the scope of per-
missible employer-employee communication in contexts other than 
collective bargaining.171 The Senate Report explaining the provision 
called these changes "important," particularly because they expanded 
employee choice in presenting grievances to the employer outside col-
lective bargaining channels.172 
168. H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 8(d)(3) (1947), reprinted in I LEG. HIST. LMRA, 
supra note 167, at 56: 
[8](d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the following shall not consti-
tute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act: 
(3) Forming or maintaining by an employer of a committee of employees and discussing 
with it matters of mutual interest, including grievances, wages, hours of employment, and 
other working conditions, if the Board has not certified or the employer has not recognized a 
representative as their representative under section 9. 
(Emphasis omitted.). 
169. See H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1947), reprinted in I LEG, HIST. 
LMRA, supra note 167, at 292, 324: 
During World War II, many employers, with the help of the Government, set up labor-
management committees, with which they discussed matters of mutual interest. This excep-
tion to section 8(a)(2) permits employers whose employees have not designated a bargaining 
representative to set up similar committees and to discuss with them wages, hours, working 
conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining as well as other matters of mutual 
interest; but an employer may discuss subjects of collective bargaining only if the employees do 
not have a certified representative or one that the employer currently recognizes as the exclu-
sive representative of the employees. This clause does not permit "company unions" •••• 
The employees generally may elect members of the committee, but section 8(a)(l) and (2) 
forbid the employer to create a formal organization having members among employees gen-
erally or other common characteristics of a labor union. 
(Emphasis in original.). 
170. S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), reprinted in 1 LEG, HIST. LMRA, supra note 167, 
at 99. 
171. S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(a) (1947), reprinted in I LEG, HIST. LMRA, supra 
note 167, at 116-17: 
SEC. 9. (a) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining 
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclu-
sive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargain-
ing in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of 
employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the 
right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances ad-
justed, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is 
not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in 
effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be 
present at such adjustment. 
(Emphasis in original.). 
172. The Senate Report states: 
The revisions of section 9 relating to representation cases make a number of important 
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The Taft and Hartley bills were then submitted to a conference 
committee, where the conferees adopted the Senate version of section 
9(a) and omitted the House language173 permitting employee commit-
tees.174 The House version was not rejected in principle, however; in-
stead, the conferees suggested that it was rejected only because the rest 
of the Act, and particularly section 9(a), was designed to permit em-
ployer-employee communication in cooperative settings.175 
The Fifth Circuit relied upon this language in holding that the 
Cabot Carbon Company's "employee-management committees" were 
not section 2(5) labor organizations.176 In reversing, the Supreme 
Court criticized the Fifth Circuit for "treat[ing] the amendment to 
§ 9(a) as though Congress had adopted, rather than rejected as it did, 
the proposed [section] advocated by the House."177 Many commenta-
tors, particularly those who criticized the Supreme Court's decision,178 
assumed that after Cabot Carbon no formal labor-management coop-
eration could take place outside the scope of section 2(5). The Sixth 
Circuit's Scott & Fetzer decision, 179 as well as a handful of Board deci-
sions, 180 have suggested that the scope of Cabot Carbon is not as great 
as some observers feared. 
The language of the conference report indicates that Congress 
clearly intended to expand opportunities for labor-management coop-
eration when it enacted the LMRA. 181 With equal force, Congress 
changes in existing law. An amendment contained in the revised proviso for section 9(a) 
clarifies the right of individual employees or groups of employees to present grievances. . . . 
The revised language would make it clear that the employee's right to present grievances 
exists independently of the rights of the bargaining representative • . . • 
S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEG. H1sr. LMRA, supra note 
167, at 407, 430 (emphasis added). 
173. See note 166 supra. 
174. H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEG. Hisr. LMRA, 
supra note 167, at 505-13. 
175. The Conference Report states: 
Section 8(d)(3) of the [Hartley bill] provided that nothing in the act was to be construed 
as prohibiting an employer from forming or maintaining a committee of employees and 
discussing with it matters of mutual interest, if the employees did not have a bargaining 
representative. This provision is omitted from the conference agreement since the act by its 
terms permits individual employees and groups of employees to meet with the employer and 
section 9(a) of the conference agreement permits employers to answer their grievances. 
1.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1947), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. LMRA, supra 
\Ote 167, at 505, 549. 
176. Cabot Carbon Co. v. NLRB, 256 F.2d 281, 288 (5th Cir. 1958), revd., 360 U.S. 203 
959). See notes 49-61 supra and accompanying text. 
177. NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 217 (1959). 
178. See, e.g., Feldman & Steinberg, supra note 61, at 375-76; cf. Note, supra note 69, at 527 
'A] number of distinguishing factors" render Cabot Carbon inapplicable to participatory man-
:ment techniques.). 
179. NLRB v. Streamway Div. of the Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982). See 
es 86-94 supra and accompanying text. 
180. See notes 95-100 supra and accompanying text. 
181. 'See note 175 supra. 
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wanted to continue the strong policy against employer-dominated 
company unions. 182 To further both of these policies, courts should 
use section 2(5) as a mechanism to distinguish employee organizations 
which are representational in nature from those which merely offer 
workers more control over and participation in managerial 
functions. 183 
Conceptually, it makes more sense to draw this distinction at the 
threshhold level of section 2(5) than at the employer-involvement 
stage of section 8(a)(2) because the difference between participatory 
management systems and conventional company unions involves the 
function of the organization(s) created, not the level of employer influ-
ence. If courts use section 8(a)(2) in their efforts to allow good-faith 
employer efforts to increase employee power over workplace decision-
making, the result may be a severely weakened 8(a)(2) doctrine which 
might not operate to prevent the employer-dominated representational 
activity the Act was designed to eliminate. Applying the representa-
tional/participatory distinction at the section 2(5) level, by contrast, 
leaves intact a strong prohibition of traditional company unionism 
while at the same time allowing employers to experiment with more 
humane and cooperative modes of industrial relations so long as the 
employees raise no objections. 
Under this analysis, participatory organizations such as QC circles 
and employee production teams, because they are often confined to 
one area of a plant and are usually not representational in nature, 
would not be subjected to section 8(a)(2) scrutiny. Plantwide par-
ticipatory programs, such as some labor-management committees and 
most QWL projects, would be examined under section 2(5) to deter-
mine whether or not their functions were representational. If the evi-
dence suggested that the organization was representational, then the 
Chicago Rawhide test could be applied under section 8(a)(2) to help 
the court decide if employer involvement was extensive enough to 
compromise the employees' freedom to choose an independent bar-
gaining representative. An unfair labor practice charge would be sus-
tained only when the requirements of both tests were met. 
CONCLUSION 
While new approaches by the Board and by courts lend hope to 
those who favor participatory management, current law makes the le-
gality of these techniques less than certain. However, a close reading 
of the cases, as well as an understanding of the policies underlying 
182. Even the proposal in § 8(d)(3) of the Hartley bill to permit representational labor-man-
agement committees was not intended to allow employers to dominate "company unions" as 
they had before passage of the Wagner Act. See note 169 supra. 
183. Compare NLRB v. Streamway Div. of the Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 
1982), with Lawson Co. v. NLRB, 753 F.2d 471 (6th Cir. 1985). 
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federal labor law, suggest that a legislative cure for this inconsistency 
may not be necessary. Rather, participatory management, when not 
intended to represent employees and when not restrictive of employee 
free choice, can and should be distinguished from employer domina-
tion of employee groups which fit more closely within the traditional 
concept of labor organizations. This distinction would not undermine 
employee freedom to organize, and would make possible a more effi-
cient, competitive, and humane system of management. 
